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ABSTRACT: I follow here some of Robert R. Williams thesis on the relationship between God, nature 
and human being in Hegel. I try to connect them with a religiosity of the absence of God in contemporary 
times, and with the absolute and unconditioned respect for the other until the sacrifice of oneself, which 
make up and legitimize the life and work of many of the contemporary civil associations. These 
associations pursue global solidarity and Hegel did not attend to them in his account of civil society.  
 
“The subjective element of poverty, or generally the distress, to which the 
individual is by nature exposed, requires subjective assistance, both in view of the 
special circumstances, and out of sympathy and love. Here, amidst all general 
arrangements, morality finds ample room to work. But since the assistance is in its 
own nature and in its effects casual, the effort of society shall be to discover a 
general remedy for penury and to do without random help”2. 
1. Action and coexistence 
“What man is, only history can tell us.” This important thesis of Wilhelm Dilthey 
is particularly valid in order to understand what human beings do, how do they live and 
what they are. Often, human beings associate with each other, join their forces, help one 
another and unite between them in order to follow a social or political aim. It is not an 
obvious or undeniable phenomenon3, if you take into account the abundant material 
available about social Darwinism. 
                                                
1  La realización de este trabajo ha sido posible gracias a una ayuda del Plan propio de 
Investigación de la Universidad de Málaga. Campus de Andalucía Tech. 
2 Hegel, G.W.F., Philosophy of Right, Tranlated by S.W. Dyde, Batoche Books, Ontario, 2001, § 
242. 
3 Recuérdese la tesis de Maquiavelo: “Se puede hacer esta generalización acerca de los seres 
humanos: son desagradecidos, volubles, mentirosos e impostores.” 
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On the other hand it is not clear whether all forms of human cooperation are 
rooted on self-interest or aggression (Konrad Lorenz). Phenomena like altruism4, 
sacrifice, empathy, consolation, compassion and love also appear to incite a large 
number of people to co-operate. These phenomena have also been profusely studied 
from empirical sciences like neurology of emotions, ethology regarding communication 
of emotions in animals (that is to say their capacity to empathise), or psychology of the 
personality. This is just one of the views of the problem. It deals with a point of view, 
which intends to explain the link between motive and human action, and the appearance 
of the capacities for altruistic action. 
This empirical point of view has to be taken into account by philosophical 
anthropology, which emerged like a synthesis of different and heterogeneous sources of 
knowledge about the human being5. But the theme of this paper will look at a particular 
source of human experience of cooperative action. It is about a source that does not 
belong to the physical, emotional or cognitive background of the human being, but to its 
environmental, cultural or social one 6 . It is true that these two backgrounds 
continuously interact7, cross and converge, due to the fact that they don’t have to be 
thought as levels or stratums, but as human dimensions. It is for this reason that health 
models and clinical practices have to take into account factors like love interaction8, 
religion or spirituality9. Because of this, critical input has to come from the integration 
of social and natural sciences, and this new science, is a philosophical one. It is 
philosophy because it has as its object the foundations of those facts, which are 
explained and determined by empirical sciences. This can be termed philosophical 
comprehension. And the ground of the facts can be yet nature already freedom. 
It seems obvious the influence of beliefs, and religious symbols and practices over 
altruistic behaviour and its socialisation. It’s also clear that the attitudes of care and 
acceptance of the other form part of the moral, religious and philosophical heritage of 
the East and the West. These are phenomena whose origin must be based in different 
cultural spheres —religion, science, worldview— that is to say, in freedom.  From here, 
we can affirm that the study of the biological base of active co-operation, selfless or 
altruistic action must be located in the plasticity and indeterminacy of human 
tendencies.  Due to this plasticity they must be culturally shaped and expressed in an 
unlimited variety of customs and institutions. With freedom appears the historicity of 
ways of life and the variability of human behaviour, the unpredictable element, that is to 
say the person, who gives ever more of himself. 
There is another cultural sphere, which plays a decisive role in human motivation: 
the economy. Generally, economic models are based on personal interest, and the 
rationality and peculiar agency of homo oeonomicus. This is the focus, which dominates 
the first classic theory of economics: The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith. 
                                                
4 Cfr.: Post, S.G., Underwood, L.G., Schloss, J. P., Hurlbut, W.B., Altruism and Altruistic Love: 
Science, Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002. 
5 Cfr.: Choza, J., Manual de antropología filosófica, Rialp, Madrid, 1989, cap. I. 
6 Underwood, L., “The Human Experience of Compassionate Love. Conceptual Mapping and Data 
from Selected Studies” en Post et alia, op. Cit., p. 76. 
7 Cfr.: Damasio, A., Descartes’ error, Putnam, New York, 1994 
8 Cfr.: Mermann, A.C., “Love in the clinical setting” en Humane Medicine, 9(4)/1993, pp. 268-273 
9 Cfr.: Underwood, L.G., “A working model of health: Spirituality and religiouness as resources: 
Applications for persons with disability” en Journal of Religion, Disability and Health, 3(3)/1995, pp. 51-
71; Kaam, A., Religion and personality, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964. 
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It isn’t by chance that the General Theory of Action was a discipline born in 
university departments of economy and sociology10. The economic models try to 
explain the movements of the human being with factors like the maximisation of 
usefulness and benefit. Mathematical disciplines such as the theory of games, the theory 
of selection by Von Neumann and Nash, or biological theories such as evolution have 
made important contributions to the General Theory of Action. However, in these 
approaches, the problem is the justification of a non-maximised behaviour. This is due 
to the mechanistic framework of these models. The rational action, rather than arising 
from an original and effusive base, which always gives more of itself, which can always 
contribute with something new, which co-exists with others, it is understood by the 
General Theory of Action as a re-action. In re-action plays a decisive role the 
calculation. A calculate action is not the same as a deliberate, or even an spontaneous 
action. Mechanically understood, the role that ideals play in the study of rational human 
action, are marginalised. And besides, it is forgotten with it, the historical accuracy of 
such ideals, and therefore the role of freedom gets blurred. 
With respect to the theme, which occupies us, one must understand the ways in 
which altruism is shown in shared and co-operative projects. These projects release 
channels of strength, experiences and feelings, in our globalised society. I want to 
observe the convergences and intersections of these new forms of altruism, of co-
operation in favour of the other, especially of the most needy person, with new forms of 
piety and religion. These are ways of being faced with the unknown, with mystery. 
Ways, which bind and join emotions and feelings, which are emerging in the 
recent transformations in civil society in a globalised world.  That is to say, in a world 
in which economic rationalisation and state planning play a more important and central 
role in the life of human beings.  Thus, two main types of actors appear on the modern 
global scene: state actors and non-state actors.  And quite often, they appear overlapping. 
An extremely plastic image of the new historical and international scene is the so-called 
international summits and Parallels Summits. In the first, the intergovernmental actors 
come together. In the second, the affected citizens and activists from different causes 
like solidarity or peace. These individuals gather around legal and non-profit 
organisations, and with clear awareness of their independency from any government, 
that is to say, with clear awareness of not being instruments of the government. The 
Parallels Summits are therefore a gigantic metaphor of change in history, which has 
given up being political in order to embrace other areas: social and cultural history.  
And all of this has happened since 1899, the moment when the first Parallels Summit 
took place at the tenth Peace Conference in The Hague. 
Between the 1st and 3rd of October 2009, the University of Cambridge held an 
important international conference, whose subject framework was “The roots of global 
civil society. From the rise of the press at the fall of the wall”. Civil society as a distinct 
form —different of family and State— of human co-operation born, as it is known, in 
the Middle Ages, around the 10th and 11th centuries, with the first trade associations, 
which form the basis of the contemporary professional associations.  But the history of 
civil society is a history of different institutions and associations, which put forward 
                                                
10 El texto fundacional de esta disciplina fue editado por dos sociólogos de la universidad de 
Harvard: Parsons, T., Shils, E., Toward a General Theory of Action,  Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1962. 
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rights which are neither immediate nor easily expressed with strategic calculations of 
political or economic power. 
Furthermore, the history of civil society has been the history of a number of social 
initiatives, which have been able to interact with the same techno-structure of the 
politico-economic-media system.  It is therefore a history which has come true in 
professional associations, syndicates, neighbourhood associations, co-operatives, 
consumer organisations, academic and cultural societies, pressure groups, sports 
organisations, Think Tanks, social clubs, religious groups, charities, voluntary 
organisations, etc.  And in addition, as the aforementioned conference wanted to study, 
globalisation has affected civil society by making it transnational or global. 
2. Rationalisation and world-disenchantment 
In the modern formation of Western States and societies, there seems to be a 
tension between two of their principles.  In a way, these States and societies base their 
social, economic, legal or political structure and legislation on subjective freedom. To 
guarantee, extend and effectively achieve freedom for citizens is the principle by which 
social, moral, economic, legal or political institutions stand. Therefore an institution like 
marriage cannot be legitimate in the modern era, from a cultural tradition that allows 
people to come to an agreement independently and voluntarily with those they marry. 
Free consent is the principle for marriage as a modern institution. The same can be said 
of the institutions of civil society or these institutions who establish and connect the 
different powers in modern states. 
We can designate this principle of freedom as its formal principle, because it 
organises feelings, experiences and plans for human beings and their activities in the 
West.  So, freedom is the principle by which the western institutions stand. But it does 
not stop producing friction with the efficiency principle of the same institutions in our 
world. Such a principle was referred to by Max Weber as “bureaucracy” and consists of 
a process of increasing rationalisation of knowledge, experiences and human life. 
For example, a very widespread practice between non-Western cultures of 
regulating violence is called vendetta. Bloody revenge is a human practice subject to 
very strict rules in primitive cultures. According to Weber, rationalisation of violence 
by means of public force, is a similar process to the rationalisation of economic, 
political or legal fields in Western societies, a process of separation and secularisation 
of different cultural classes and their respective institutions. As much for Kant as for 
Hegel, the process of rationalisation ends in a universal legislation, in which one can 
achieve freedom and recognize the human self-consciousness. Thereby, the process of 
rationalisation is inseparable from the awareness of the realisation of the universal 
history, that is to say, the history in a cosmopolitan sense. 
This is why bureaucracy should be easily joined together with the principle of 
subjective freedom, because the history of bureaucracy is the history of rational 
procedures, and thereby universals, that allow to extend self-consciousness of human 
freedom, and effectively achieve it in a world and in a history which are not so varied 
and diverse in values, symbols and views of the world, like the world of the primitive 
and ancient peoples. With an increasing process of rationalisation, bureaucracy is a 
process of increasing disillusionment in the world. The world is becoming more 
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predictable, more calculable, the future less uncertain. Knowledge is divided up into 
administrative elements, in areas of knowledge, in which research is bindingly linked to 
progress and not ‘merely’ to the education of the individual. 
This means that knowledge is linked to the discovery of technical means of 
bureaucratic planning and resolution of social and human problems. This is why 
contemporary states have taken the form of states of wellbeing, and in their midst an 
alliance between political, economic and media subsystems has been produced in the 
form of a technical framework, a techno-structure. This techno-structure designs, 
predicts, and implements the means to achieve human ideals. Thereby, the individual 
gives up his ethical, legal, and religious education, in the german sense of the word 
“Bildung”. Committees of experts advise, and ultimately legitimise the decision, and as 
a result human beings remain in the unfortunate state of specialists without spirit (those 
who calculate, the bureaucrats) and sensualists without heart (men to whom the 
necessity of taking a conscious decision has been removed). 
3. Life, community and religion in modern times 
Apparently, subjective freedom and bureaucracy are joined, since rationalisation 
appears as the guarantee and the safeguard in the objective level of subjective freedom.  
And therefore Hegel, who is justly seen as the first and principal theorist on modern 
society and modern forms of life, was able to assert that the State is the ethical 
substance of modern society, that is to say, the State is responsible for making 
institutions coherent with the dignity of the human being and which make possible ways 
of life which are truly humane. 
But it is Hegel himself who begins to be aware of the difficulties of the modern 
states to guarantee and achieve ways of life according to the dignity of human beings. In 
his Lectures about Philosophy of Religion dictated in 1821 and recently published, 
Hegel’s tone remind that of Max Weber’s about the disenchantment of the world, and 
surprised the usual reader of Hegel’s published works. The success of rationalization for 
Weber involves the replacement of morality by bureaucracy. The actualization of the 
ideals would compete to the state. For Hegel, the diagnosis is similar, because in the 
modern world: 
“all virtue and right, everything sacred in human institutions and affairs, the 
majesty of everything that has infinite value —all are cast upon the dung heap… 
Everything ethical… was destroyed, and there remained to the established order 
only an entirely bare, external cold authority— only death —from which the 
degraded… life that was inwardly aware of itself did not recoil”.11 
This is a surprising text. Hegel has always been considered the philosopher of the 
modern state. The end of history becomes the end of political history, the actualization 
                                                
11 Hegel, G.W.F., LPR, 3: 130-131. Cited by Williams, R., Tragedy, Recognition, and the Death of 
God: Studies in Hegel and Nietzsche, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 315. I follow here some 
of Williams thesis on the relationship between God, nature and human being in Hegel. I try to connect 
them with a religious of the absence of God in contemporary times, and with the absolute and 
unconditioned respect for the other until the sacrifice of oneself, which make up and legitimize the life 
and work of many of the contemporary civil associations. These associations pursue global solidarity and 
Hegel did not attend to them in his account of civil society.  
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of equality and freedom between human beings. But suddenly, it appears “a theological-
political critique of modernity”12, and therefore a critique of the institutions, and among 
them a critique of the modern institution as such: the State, which seems incapable of 
guaranteeing the most sacred in human institutions and affairs, that is to say subjective 
freedom and dignity. Why? 
 It could be interpreted that the previous text could be related to the paragraphs of 
the Philosophy of Law, in which Hegel addresses the problem of poverty (§§ 241 ff.). 
There it speaks of the masses, of the islands of poverty and marginalization that the 
economic mechanism itself generates. Hegel looked at the world during his time and 
was aware of human exploitation caused by the industrial revolution (§ 198), of 
excessively harsh workloads (243), of the unwanted effects of industrialization on 
unemployment and marginalization, and the inability of the legal and economic systems, 
in order to solve the injury to personal dignity which means to be part of the mob, the 
mass, the rubbish, of those human beings and are neither recognized as people nor seen 
as such by themselves. But this lack of recognition implies a deep fragmentation in 
modern society, which is split between those who have achieved a certain welfare and 
recognition, and those who lack even the compassion of the first: those who lie in abject 
misery, the despised, humiliated those who are extremely vile. 
Civil society, with independency of it prosperity, as Hegel thinks, it is unable to 
remedy the problem of poverty (§ 245). The system of necessities itself generates 
poverty, and therefore destroys ethical life, subjective freedom, and awareness with 
respect to the moral value of human beings. This is the usual reading. The Marxist 
theory of alienation is based upon it, and the Hegelian theory that the problem of 
poverty can only be fixed by public authority, that is to say, by the State. 
The focus of Hegel is much like the Weberian polytheism of values. According to 
Weber, rationality either scientific or philosophical is unable to resolve the preferred 
values. Each person in his practical actions must do this. One should behave, at least, 
according to the consequences of one's actions. One can act following principles, acting 
by conviction. In any case, the values to be performed remain absolute but 
irreconcilable. It’s necessary to choose amongst absolutes, and this implies to reject 
absolutes. 
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit speaks of a similar situation. This is tragedy. 
Tragedy is tragedy, not because of a conflict between right and wrong. It is not a 
melodrama. It is tragedy because it faces what is right with right, violated law with 
enacted law, opposes a freedom and a will to another. But in such situation the tragic 
hero and the chorus included in the conflict can only be perplexed. This conflict 
between absolutes, this polytheism destroys the ethical life of the Greeks, because every 
hero is identified with one of the ethical powers of society, or what is the same, with 
one of the substantial interests of freedom. In the case of Antigone, the tragic conflict 
arises between an institution, which form and offer human beings for the city, namely 
the family, and the laws enacted, that men give to themselves. So the tragedy marked 
the beginning of the breakup of the Greek ethos. The ethical totality and its absolute 
character fragments and shatters into the tragedy. 
                                                
12 Williams, R., op. Cit., p. 314. 
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The decomposition of ethical totality happens, according to Hegel, in comedy. 
Comedy is precisely the time for the relativisation of substantial powers with which the 
heroes are identified. They fought for them. The emptiness left by the ethical life of the 
Beautiful Hellas, is called by Hegel the unhappy consciousness. It is the misfortune of 
self-consciousness, which is intended to be absolute, and yet finds nothing whatsoever, 
no substantial power that cannot be consumed by satire and comedy. The text we have 
quoted portrays exactly this situation, the misfortune of consciousness, and hence the 
misfortune of modern subjectivity, which is also known as infinite, free, and finds 
nothing absolute around it. There are no absolutes in a world of consumption, private 
rights for some and marginalization and depravity for others. This is the dissolution of 
modern ethics. 
What does it mean, the dissolution of all ethics, his shipwreck found by tragedy 
and consumed by satire and comedy? According to Hegel, the characteristic of Greek 
life lay in what he called the ethical beauty. In Greece, the ideal and the divine was not 
something transcendent, which is beyond. The divine, and the ideals, connect, nurture 
give immanent strength. The divine was manifested, appeared freely in the public 
sphere, in the polis, as Hannah Arendt has shown. The gods were not beyond. At the 
beginnings of the Greek culture, the  archaic deities were gods of nature, such as Aeolus, 
Gaia and Uranus. In the classical times, the Olympian gods were among human matters. 
They also had a polis and political relations among each other. Community and ethical 
life were inextricably linked, according to Hegel, in Greece. But it was a totality with a 
weak and fragile cohesion, as it is shown by tragic conflicts. 
The polis and the republic were ‘the final limit of the world’ for the Greeks and 
Romans. But with the flow of history, republic system collapsed. And with this, it 
weaken the motivational forces of perfection for the citizens. According to Pinkard, “the 
loss of such a good left people with nothing to inspire them except the cold ideals of 
protecting property and the fear of death. In this context, Christianity, which promised 
eternal life to those who slavishly followed its dictates, stepped into the void left by the 
disappearance of the Greek and Roman divinities.”13 In his Early writings Hegel 
opposes to this form of religiosity, which he consider servile. Such religiosity is the 
negative side of the Absolute Subject of the Hebrew religion. For Hegel, such a 
religiosity is “only a union through domination, the power of a stranger over a 
stranger.”14 Therefore Hegel criticizes the conception of divinity as the Supreme Being, 
a conception expressed in monarchist metaphors. For God cannot be thought of as a 
monarch of the universe and over men, a Pantocrator beyond them, separate of them, 
and dominating them. 
This is, according to Hegel, the metaphysical and theological conception since the 
dissolution of the Beautiful Hellas until the completion of modernity. This is an onto-
theological conception, as Williams has noted, because it separates two areas in reality, 
that of the infinite and perfect against the finite, the eternal in front of the mortal. This 
onto-theological conception has its sociological counterpart in the pyramidal structure 
of society, and it most perfect example in the enlightened despotism. An elite rules for 
the good of the state, but without any community with the folk. This elite governs an 
                                                
13 Cfr.: Pinkard, T., Hegel. A biography, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 65-66. 
14 Cited by Williams, R., Tragedy, Recognition…, p. 294. I follow Williams interpretation of 
Hegel’s philosophy of Religion, and particularly in his interpretation of Hegel as an pan-en-theist, and the 
meaning of the true infinite in religion. 
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ignorant society without resources. But this is also the result of techno-scientific 
bureaucratization of society, with its elite of experts, and social engineers. 
Hegel discovered an alternative model to the onto-theological one in the and the 
Pauline theology of the Cross, and the kenosis. The loss of all that is substantial is what 
Christianity calls Good Friday, the death of God, the waste and emptiness of the same 
divinity, the kenosis. God took the form of a servant, it makes Himself finite, entered 
into human relationships, lived among us, resigned Himself to its quite being. But this 
renunciation to his being-in-himself, to His being before the creation of the world, i.e. 
before any relation of God to the other, is a dissolution of its substance, and of its 
tranquillity. 
Hegel interprets that in this emptiness is where divine subjectivity appears. This is 
the transition of his substantiality to his subjectivity. Or rather, the divine self dissolves 
its abstract substance into the abysmal night, on the night of I = I, on the night of 
subjectivity. And it does this because freedom and subjectivity is the capability to be 
itself, at home, on the other, into the different of itself. The actualization of a 
subjectivity requires another subjectivity and a serious relationship with this other. This 
relationship means that there is no possible actualization of oneself independently of the 
other’s actualization. It is subjective in nature, being certain in a way, said Aristotle's 
nous.  That is, what Plato called eros, and what is implied by Hegel in his treatment of 
recognition, as Robert R. Williams has shown. 
So, the kenosis is taking form of a servant, human flesh, entering into a serious 
relationship which the finite. And a relationship that has to accept death, and the death 
of cross. There is no kenosis according to Hegel without acceptation of the most 
profound anguish, the anguish before death, which God shares within all human nature. 
On Good Friday, it is not only the death of the abstract God, of the identity that is not 
related to the other, call it divine impassiveness, call it fate or necessity. It is the death 
of the death —mors mortis— the discovery of subjectivity, of it being oneself in the 
other, the establishment of the person as subjectivity and relationship. And this implies 
that God finds himself in its other, in finitude, poverty, pain, anguish and death. Hegel 
speaks of the absolute Idea incorporating in itself the infinite pain of the finite. The 
kenosis, according to Hegel, illustrates the true infinity, the infinity which is not 
separated from the finite. 
But the death of God, the Good Friday, is only the beginning of the community of 
God with men. Its development is speculative Good Friday, the search for a universal 
community in which develops self-awareness and extends freedom to human boundaries. 
The slogan that Holderlin, Schelling and Hegel had, during his years at Tübingen, said 
“come to us the kingdom of the God”, i.e., the bond of love for the religious community.  
As Williams has shown, Hegel far from being an accomplished Western 
metaphysicist is better described as the first serious critic of onto-theological models of 
reality. The last word of Hegel would not be Idea in the Science of Logic, but the final 
reconciliation in the true infinite. The finite is but a manifestation of the infinite, its 
echo, one of its fragments, or rather of its moments. Its ground is the infinite. Human 
being is included, is incorporated into the infinite, within a community. 
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Hegel's religiosity is to be defined by the intersection of these four problems: God 
is subject, in any way substance. But absolute subjectivity is not to be separated from 
others, the world, men and history. Also, this religion of closeness, of be oneself in the 
other, must be nutritious for the other, must give him strength and must connect them, 
as the polis produce life for the humans in the Beautiful Hellas. Because of this, religion 
is not only linked to a community, the kingdom of God, but must integrate everything 
that is human.  
And this is the most defining of the Hegelian religiosity, the absolute value of 
finitude, the knowledge of the infinite value of the finite. And this is also what Hegel 
criticized for modernity at the sight of poverty. “Everything ethical … was destroyed”, 
“everything sacred in human institutions and affaris, the majesty of everything that has 
infinite value —all are cast upon the dung heap”15. As Robert Williams has shown “The 
disintegration of ethical life generates a crisis for modern civil society. The extremes of 
extravagant wealth and abject poverty not only delegitimate civil society, but threaten to 
tear it apart. These developments mark the return of the figure of master and slave 
within a world where slavery is supposedly abolished in principle. (…) The extremes of 
wealth and poverty make clear that modernity has not abolished tragedy either, but 
rather is only the most recent scene where freedom comes to tragic realization”16. 
4. Piety and global civil society 
 God and the Absolute for Hegel is what is at the back. At the back, not in the 
eyes or projected on a distant beyond. No it is sighted, but it behaves. There are some 
theology of silence and the absence of the divine in the Hegelian God. This absence is 
neither inexistence nor presence. It is default. There is not absence of God, like in the 
atheism, as if the gods had fled. This is not a departure, or nihilism, but an eclipse, a 
concealment, or not-making an appearance. God lives in the finitude, as the other of 
himself. The finite is not external to him, and the human life has absolute value. Hegel 
has fought against the ontologyzing of the divine.  
God is the Absolute at the back, this absolute has been understood as spiritual 
substance, that is, as latency, as hidden God, as the implicit, the quiet, and the 
background of consciousness, its last depth. So the historical process of awareness of 
the value of human freedom, and the extension of it becomes a crack the shell that hides 
the infinite, a struggle of the same Idea to overcome its alienation, its estrangement in 
space and time, and whose purpose is the appear of the same Idea, the manifestation of 
herself. 
However, as highlighted Jacinto Choza, contemporary piety “is veneration on the 
other, granting himself the dignity of the mystery, his or her sacred origin.” “It is not an 
abstract piety, neither it refers only to God as a distant father. It refers also to God such 
as a close brother, like a man, like Jesus.” Piety is a human tendency that is the ground 
of religion. Because of piety we venerate ours own origins, like the fathers, the country, 
and God. And we venerate our own origins not only on the subjective level. The ways 
of behaving, living and being are habits that can be institutionalized and recognized 
                                                
15 Hegel, G.W.F., LPR 3: 130-1, cited by Williams, R., Tragedy, Recognition and Death of God, p. 
315. 
16 Williams, R., Tragedy, Recognition and Death of God, pp. 316-317. 
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later by the public consciousness. Hegel could say that God found himself in the finite, 
in the other of himself. That is the Kenosis. God finds himself in poverty, and a highly 
visible part of global civil society meets God in the poor, in anguish before the death of 
the refugee camps, in humanitarian missions, in the marginalized sick person, in the 
socially excluded, in the criminal, and in general in humanitarian assistance, in the 
practice of a solidarity, that in the XXI century has a global dimension. 
Hegel did not know the civil society in which we are living. He did not think that 
civil society could adopt non-profit form. Furthermore, he did not think that civil 
society could have a transnational character. But he would have enjoy a lot knowing of 
social initiatives such as Save the children, Médecins sans Frontiers o International 
Amnesty. These are initiatives where some human beings associate each other in other 
to be nutritious for other men, to give them strength, to link them. That is precisely what 
the ancient polis was for their citizens. 
Hegel would have been disconcerted, because the social initiatives he knew were 
not so powerful. They were restricted to the practice of individual charity, or by any 
religious group. Neither, he did not think that religious values could pervade and could 
legitimize civil associations. For him, civil society could only have an economic 
legitimacy. Civil society stands for the protection of the interests of certain groups. But 
it happened that these non-profit transnational associations, that pursue global solidarity, 
appeared just after the death of Hegel. They arose scarcely a year and a half after his 
death. 
On the 23rd of April in 1833 the French man Antoine-Frédéric Ozanam founded a 
humanitarian group, the Society of saint Vicente of Paul. Nine years later this group 
worked to an international level. Now it operates in 148 countries, and it united 
approximately 1.300.000 volunteers, organized through conferences. Such conferences, 
did not have a state scope, but they organize themselves in centres such as a school, a 
hospital, a community centre, a church etc. The members did not have to be Catholics, 
although they should not ignore that they are dealing with a catholic society. This civil, 
private association is usually considered the first, which operated solidarity on a global 
level. In the directory of associations of the pontifical council for the laics, one can find 
more to more than a hundred of these associations.  
The World Council of Churches (WWC) was founded in 1937, with a strong 
ecumenical mentality. And this means with the intention of spreading over the dogmatic 
boundaries that divide the different evangelical churches. Ecumenism was way for it’s 
founders as they wanted to “debate ways to confront social problems and issues of 
world peace. At the moment of its foundation, the World Council of Churches gather 
together 147 churches. Currently members of the Council include 349 churches from 
110 countries, which represent 560 million Christians. According to Moyser the WWC 
“has, over the years, been a significant moral force in the international community, 
espousing solidarity with the world’s poor and oppressed and highlighting a wide range 
of major issues such as racism, the status of women, needy children, migrant workers, 
refugees, global warming, and the arms race”17. 
                                                
17 Moyser “World Council of Churches” en Wuthnow, R., (edit.) The Encyclopedia of Politics and 
Religion, Routledge, Londres, p. 794. Citado por Madeley, op. Cit., p. 66. 
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Catholic associations have a lot in common, either with social initiatives initiated 
by WCC or those developed under the support of the organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC). Above all, these organizations inspired by a particular religious 
creed have a lot in common with other international organizations who have no such 
inspiration and who have spread worldwide to different areas promoting human 
development and integration. They reveal a not-degraded vitality; a vitality that knows 
about itself, and that does not pull back neither from death, nor from poverty, nor to 
limited resources. It appears an alternative to costing and rationalization as an efficient 
principle of modern societies. Or rather, it appears it is not disassociated to the formal 
and efficient principle of modern society: On the one hand subjective freedom, dignity, 
the moral value of each. On the other hand solidarity, fraternity, and not merely the 
rationalization of the other. It appears a configuration of civil society that does not 
satisfy itself neither with the consumption nor the mere assertion of hedonistic and 
private rights, but that it is not ready to let the poor fall into abjectness. It appears so an 
absolute consciousness, that of every man who finds the Absolute around him. And this 
lay at the most imaginable distant from the unhappy consciousness and the comedy. 
